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one part, and the federal government of the other, and that the
former in national convention were to be frequently assembled
to decide on the constitutionality of the latter's acts." Then he
continues: "Jefferson regarded the compact as exclusively between states, but he regarded the amendment process as furnishing the states the opportunity of being the final arbiters of
what the Constitution means." (p. 155)
Jefferson was more an actor and a stimulator of action than
a theorist. Mr. Patterson, however, shows us a Jefferson in the
study and not a Jefferson in the ring. But this is no distortion;
rather it is an aspect of a many-sided man. This Jefferson, the
aspect of him justified by the title of the book, is a man of fertile thought and immense energy expressed through a tireless
pen. Mr. Patterson selects what deals with the organization of
American government from the great fund of his writings, and
gives the reader a good summation of these thoughts, sometimes
contradictory but generally harmonious. Unlike Professor Crosskey, 2 he has nothing earthshaking to say of the Constitution, or
of Jefferson's principles. He has not revealed a new Jefferson.
He presents the self-stated evidence.
The chapter on Jefferson the lawyer will be of particular
interest to those who, as little expert on Jefferson as I, have
failed to appreciate the attainment and promise of Jefferson's
few years in the profession before he entered upon his more
brilliant career of public service.
William G. Rice*
THE MEANING OF INCOME IN THE LAW OF INcomE TAX,

by Francis

Eugene LaBrie. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1953.
Pp. 380. $15.00.
It is Professor LaBrie's announced intention to present in
this treatise "a complete picture of the case law on the meaning
of income and then to superimpose on this law the text of the
Canadian statutes." (p. vii) This formulation of approach calls
to mind Dean Griswold's aphorism that "[t]here is no use thinking great thoughts about a tax problem unless the thoughts are
firmly based on the controlling statute." Fortunately Professor
2. CROSSKEY, PoLricS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES (1953).

*Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
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LaBrie's announced approach deters him very little from making
the only kind of analysis one really can make of a statutedominated field of law: What does the statute say? What have
the courts said it says? When the statute hasn't said, how have
the courts filled in the interstitial spaces? In filling the interstitial spaces, real or imagined, to what extent have the courts been
guided by superficial analysis informed by "common experience"
and to what extent by rigorous analysis of the actual economic
and social experience which has guided legislative and administrative policy-making?
In his foreword Professor LaBrie also indicates that he has
made this purely a legal treatise by deleting from it the discussions of economic and accounting concepts of income. This makes
for clearer comparison of Canadian and English experience in the
judicial interpretation of a complex and many-sided income tax
statute with the American experience. The disadvantage most
evident in this approach is that it does not keep in quite as sharp
a focus the extent to which judicial interpretation has distorted
legislative intent by disdaining economic and accounting conceptions.
One notes from this book that the English courts are theoretically more limited in their review of tax questions than the
Canadian courts. As in the case of review by our own federal
judiciary, however, the English courts, as the author puts it,
"have the power to decide the meaning of the terms used
throughout the English Act, to decide whether any question
arising before them is one of fact or of law, and to reverse the
commissioners' finding on all questions of fact where they are of
opinion that there was no evidence before the commissioners to
support that finding. Where the courts have chosen to give any
term used in the English Act an "ordinary meaning" they thereby
permit any ruling of the commissioners thereon to stand as being
a question of fact. But they may at any time attribute a special
connotation to a word or phrase of the Act; and, having done so,
they can hold there to have been no evidence before the commissioners to support their finding, in the light of the extended
or altered meaning placed on the phraseology in question." (p.
19) It seems hardly necessary to note that there is ample room
within this sweep of power for substitution of a judicial for a
legislative conception of what facts underlie statutory words.
The book contains much excellent insight into the develop-
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ment of a conception of income so narrow as to exclude capital
gains to the substantial extent they are excluded under English
and Canadian law. From the author's analysis the genesis of the
exclusion seems to lie in the judicial determination that "profits
or gains" intended to be taxed are only those arising from the
carrying on of a trade or business or in pursuit of gain. (p. 23)
Casual profits made on an isolated purchase and sale escape
taxation unless they are merged with similar transactions sufficient to constitute a trade or business. But they also escape
taxation because it is thought that a tax on such transactions
would be a tax on principal. Thus the English cases contain
unctuous House of Lords pronouncements that "'it cannot be
taken that the Legislature meant to impose a duty on that which
is not profit derived from property, but the price of it.'" (p. 136)
Yet such interpretations seem the sheerest gloss on statutory
language which contains no hint of such limitations (p. 10); the
effect has been to plunge the English and Canadian courts into
a morass of litigation concerned with determining whether a
capital increment was realized while in pursuit of gain and hence
taxable or a mere realized accretion in the value of an investment. Professor LaBrie summarizes that "income does not include the realized value (which is a source of income)," (p. 22)
a proposition for which Canadian courts, he notes, draw support
from Eisner v. Macomber. (p. 137) Thus, despite the inadequacies
in the income definition contained in Eisner v. Macomber recognized by our courts, in Canada it is still a touchstone that income
is "'the gain derived from capital, from labour, or from both
combined.'" (p. 22) The Canadian courts might better have
searched beyond Eisner v. Macomber (252 U.S. 189) and examined Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Company (247 U.S. 179, 185)
and other early American cases interpreting our statutory language, "gains ... from . . . dealings in property." (INT. REV.
CODE § 22(a) (1939) ) As a matter of fact, however, the very
language taken as a touchstone is accompanied by a proviso that
such language "be understood to include profit gained through a
sale or conversion of capital assets. . . ." There seems nothing
but judicial fantasy behind the English notion that levying a
"duty" upon the gain on a sale of property is the same as levying
a duty on the price of the asset sold. Professor LaBrie's criticism
of the confused meaning of income emerging from English and
Canadian case law is nonetheless gentlemanly, thus:
"In spite of the fact that the principle that income does not
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include capital gains can only be of assistance in determining
the meaning of income in the limited class of cases wherein gain
results from selling activity, the English courts have managed to
adhere generally to that test and avoid separate investigation into
the meaning of income without at the same time producing
decisions too far out of line with the dictates of common sense
(though it is not meant to suggest that the test has not enabled
a great deal of gain to be sought and won without the payment
of income tax). .

.

.Wherever absurd results might be seen to

arise in the 'in-between' type of case they have been fairly well
avoided through an extension of the meaning of trading." (p. 72)
The author notes that as a result of English judicial insistence on linking "profits or gains" inextricably with "trade" so
as to exclude capital gains not enjoyed in trade, there has not
been the judicial examination of capital gains as an independent
phenomenon which would otherwise have been possible. His
criticism, however, goes no further than to say, "the question in
distinguishing income from capital gain should be, not whether
there is a trade being carried on, but whether there is an intention to pursue gain through that method." (p. 80) While a shift
to this test and away from the test of "trade" would immeasurably simplify the administration of the tax, this reviewer had
anticipated LaBrie might go further and advocate the Congressional approach, long since upheld by the judiciary, of subjecting all "gains ... from .

.

. dealings in property" to tax and

softening or deferring the impact of the tax where the gains are
long-term in character or in other respects qualify for special
treatment. The congressional approach has at least the virtue
of drawing no invidious distinction between the dollars earned
by turning over "sources of income" and those earned through
some less colorful "trade or business." (p. 100)
As Professor LaBrie's analysis of the English and Canadian
cases unfolds it takes on, here and there, an almost Alice in
Wonderland quality. Juxtaposed against the willingness shown
on the part of the judiciary to let a great deal of gain escape
tax on the ground that to tax it would be to "impose a duty on
that which is not profit derived from property, but the price of
it" is exposed a past unwillingness on the part of the judiciary
to exempt from tax a clear capital element contained in annuities
on the ground that such capital has been "converted into income."
(p. 142) It has taken the findings and recommendations of a
Canadian royal commission to demonstrate the inequity of taxing
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annuity payments in full. (p. 147) By way of comparison one
might note that Congress has almost from the inception of modern income taxation recognized the capital element in annuity
payments and has now completely recognized financial realities
in adopting a "life expectancy" method. (INT. REv. CODE §
22 (b) (2) (1939); INT. REV. CODE § 72 (1954) )
Until recently, Professor LaBrie notes, lump sum payments
received in exchange for the unconditional right to use a patent
for a designated number of years have been regarded in England
and Canada as a receipt of capital. (p. 157) He notes further,
however, that more attention is now being paid to the fact that
patent and copyright values arise through the inventors' or
author's labor and that such payments, whether by way of assignments or licensing agreements, are by way of deferred income
for personal services. (p. 162) No doubt as the problem grows
more acute some compromise solution such as that provided by
Congress in the 1954 Code will appear desirable. Thus Congress
now accords long-term capital gains treatment to payments
received under a transfer of patent rights whether received in
installments or in a lump sum. (INT. REV. CODE § 1235 (1954) )
However, no such handy device as an expedient extension of
long-term capital gains treatment is available unless capital gains
are given more formal recognition by the English and Canadians
than at present.
The author's analysis of the English cases indicates a curious
reversal of roles between the courts and the revenue commissioners in the area of deductions from gross income. Thus "the
question whether deduction of the expenditure is expressly prohibited by the Act . . . is considered as a question of fact within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the commissioners, subject to there
being evidence to support their finding" whereas "the question
whether or not an expenditure constitutes a proper debit item
in the computation of the balance of the taxpayer's profits and
gains is . . . a question of law for the courts to be decided with
reference to those business and accounting principles which
they regard as sound and are, therefore, prepared to accept."
(p. 242) There follows this startling statement: "This question
of law is comparatively free from legislative control under either
the English or the Canadian acts. . . ." (p. 243) If such freedom
from legislative control has existed in Canada, the legislature
seems to be moving rapidly away from it in the direction of
identifying and describing permissible deductions in detail; a
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disposition on the part of the Canadian courts to flout the detailed
directions of their lawmakers in favor of English or Canadian
case-law precedents to the contrary seems hardly likely.
Thus, while still much simpler than our Internal Revenue
Code, the Canadian Income Tax Act of 1948 moves appreciably
in the direction of the kind of detailed treatment of deductions,
as well as of other income tax matters, which we have found
essential to uniform administration. The delightful disregard
for economic and accounting realities which is continually appearing in Professor LaBrie's collection of case materials has no
doubt had a great deal to do with this development.
Melvin G. Dakin*
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

